The Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) on 21 October 2026 approved A2A’s voluntary commitments in an abuse‑of‑dominance investigation concerning its electric‑vehicle charging network. The acceptance introduces explicit limits on volume‑based discount thresholds and sets new criteria for wholesale roaming tariffs in the EV‑charging sector. A2A must adjust its pricing model, while smaller charging operators gain clearer entry conditions.

Full News Breakdown

The dispute began when the AGCM opened a probe into A2A’s pricing practices, alleging that the group’s discounts and roaming fees squeezed rival operators’ margins. After a period of dialogue, A2A submitted a package of commitments that the authority placed on public consultation, aiming to restore competitive balance.

• Case Name: A2A EV‑charging dominance investigation

• Court: Italian Competition Authority (AGCM)

• Panel: Competition Division, Section II

• Date: 21 October 2026

• Citation: No. A577/2026 (AGCM)

• EU Instruments / UK Legislation Cited: Article 102 TFEU; Italian Competition Act No. 287/1990, art. 6‑bis

• Key Provisions: art. 102 TFEU (abuse of dominance); art. 6‑bis (Italian Competition Act) – margin‑squeezing test; art. 5 (AGCM Guidelines on discounting)

• Primary Legal Issue: Whether A2A’s volume‑based discounts and wholesale roaming prices constitute margin squeezing in breach of dominance rules

• Applicant/Plaintiff Arguments: The AGCM argued that discounts below a defined margin eroded rivals’ ability to cover wholesale costs, creating a predatory pricing effect.

• Respondent/Defendant Arguments: A2A contended that its discounts reflected efficiency gains and that roaming tariffs were set in line with market practice.

• Court's Reasoning: The authority found that the absence of transparent thresholds made it impossible to assess the fairness of discounts, and that roaming prices lacked an objective cost‑plus methodology.

• Holding: The AGCM accepted the proposed commitments as sufficient to remedy the identified abuse.

• Operative Order: A2A must revise its discount schedule to respect the new threshold and apply the prescribed cost‑plus formula for roaming tariffs within 30 days.

• Practical Outcome: A2A will restructure its pricing, and smaller operators receive a level‑playing field under the clarified rules.

How Does This Affect You?

Before the decision, market participants were uncertain about the permissible depth of volume discounts and the methodology for setting roaming fees. The AGCM’s acceptance of the commitments defines concrete thresholds and a cost‑plus benchmark, removing much of that ambiguity. Practically, firms can now design pricing schemes that align with the authority’s parameters, reducing the risk of future enforcement actions.

For Lawyers & Advocates

• Amend client discount schedules to stay within the AGCM‑defined threshold, referencing art. 6‑bis of the Italian Competition Act as the governing provision.

• Draft wholesale roaming agreements that embed the cost‑plus formula stipulated by the authority, ensuring transparency and compliance.

• Update competition risk‑assessment checklists to include the new discount and roaming criteria as baseline metrics for any future pricing review.

• Cite the A2A commitments as persuasive authority when negotiating settlements in other EU dominance cases involving margin squeezing.

• Advise boards that any further alteration of pricing policies may trigger a fresh dominance review under Italian law, requiring shareholder approval.

For Law Students

The case illustrates how national competition authorities operationalise the margin‑squeezing test under Article 102 TFEU.
The core doctrine concerns the interaction between dominant firms’ pricing autonomy and the requirement to avoid predatory discounting.
The decision is particularly relevant for the study of:

• EU competition law – abuse of dominance

• Pricing strategies in regulated markets

• Comparative analysis of national versus EU competition enforcement

• Economic assessment of margin‑squeezing

• Legal drafting of voluntary commitments

Comparing this judgment with United Brands v Commission (1978) and Intel Corp. v Commission (2009) shows how the EU courts have refined the threshold analysis for discounting, highlighting the shift from a purely qualitative test to a more quantitative, cost‑plus approach.

For Businesses

• EV‑charging platform operators must revise internal pricing models to respect the AGCM’s discount ceiling; failure may lead to renewed investigations and possible fines.

• Wholesale electricity suppliers to charging networks need to document compliance with the cost‑plus roaming criteria in their contracts; non‑compliance could result in denied market access.

• Automotive manufacturers offering bundled charging services should reassess bundled pricing to avoid indirect facilitation of prohibited discounting, mitigating reputational and regulatory risk.

Key Takeaways

• The AGCM now codifies explicit discount thresholds and a cost‑plus methodology for roaming tariffs, filling a gap in Italian competition law on margin squeezing.

• Competition lawyers must incorporate these parameters into client pricing reviews and use the commitments as a benchmark in settlement negotiations.

• Regulators can enforce the new limits directly, limiting discretionary assessments of discount abuse absent reference to the established criteria.

• Watch the European Commission’s consultation on harmonising discount thresholds for digital energy services, slated for early 2027.

• In‑house counsel should brief clients on the revised pricing obligations before the 20 November 2026 consultation deadline to avoid exposure to enforcement action.

Source: Utility group A2A offers remedies in Italian EV charging dominance-abuse probe